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ISSN 0455-0420I. World Economic Develop-
ments
World economic growth this year is likely to
remain as weak as in 1998, despite a gradual
acceleration in the course of the year. The vol-
ume of world trade is estimated to have fallen
significantly in the latter half of last year, and
to date there are few signs of a rapid recovery.
However, there are indications of improved in-
vestor sentiment in a number of emerging mar-
ket economies, and the monetary authorities in
many industrial economies have lowered short-
term interest rates significantly since last au-
tumn. In the absence of further financial market
turmoil, a modest global recovery is expected
to develop this year, led by improved prospects
for the Asian economies. World GDP is ex-
pected to rise by 3 per cent in 2000, after
growth of 2V4 per cent this year (Table 1).
The industrial economies as a group are not
expected to contribute significantly to the over-
all rebound. The economy of the United States
has remained much stronger than expected, but
could experience a soft landing next year, par-
ticularly if the Federal Reserve decides to tight-
en monetary policy. Activity in Japan may at
best stabilise next year after two years of de-
clining GDP, with many firms continuing to
have excess capacity, and domestic demand ex-
pected to remain weak. The continuing weak-
ness of Japan will help to keep the upturn in
the emerging markets within bounds. Growth
should pick up in Western Europe over the next
eighteen months, helped by the present relaxed
monetary conditions. However, a recovery this
year remains far from assured, with activity
likely to be particularly weak in Germany and
Italy.
The present, historically low, rate of in-
flation in the industrial world may rise slightly,
partly as a result of some recovery in world
prices for primary commodities, recently in par-
ticular for oil. In the euro area, import prices
will also rise as a result of the recent depre-
ciation of the euro against the dollar. The con-
tinued strength of the dollar can be partly attri-
buted to the very strong performance of the
American economy compared with the Euro-
pean economy, and to the rising interest rate
differentials with Europe. We expect that de-
velopments in the opposite direction will
weaken the dollar again. Section VI of this
report illustrates a scenario with a more sub-
stantial weakening in the aftermath of a col-
lapse in equity prices.
The Western European economy has been
strongly affected by the adverse developments
in the crisis regions. This has depressed indus-
trial production significantly over the past year.
The prospects for Europe are heavily dependent
on the timing and extent to which these effects
fade away. The American economy has been a
strong engine for world economic growth up to
now, but there are several imbalances that may
lead to a slowdown over the next eighteen
months. This could have a substantial impact
on the European economy.

























































2.41. Moderate Recovery in Non-
industrial Countries
The current pattern of economic growth in the
non-industrial world is mixed. Since the latter
half of last year, conditions have worsened in
many emerging market economies. Output has
declined in Latin America, and growth in the
transition countries has slowed in the aftermath
of the Russian crisis and the cyclical downturn
in Western Europe. However, a number of
Asian economies now show signs of recovery.
Overall, we expect output in the non-industrial
world to grow by 2
lA per cent this year, for the
second year in succession. Growth is projected
to accelerate to around 4 per cent next year.
Activity in South East Asia is expected to
pick up this year and next, but by less than
might be expected, because demand in the
Japanese economy is expected to weaken once
more as the current public investment expan-
sion comes to an end. Even so, growth for Asia
excluding Japan may reach 4
l/i per cent this
year and rise to over 5 per cent in 2000. Signs
of an improved outlook are particularly appar-
ent in Korea where GDP has begun to rise.
Growth in China appears to have remained ro-
bust, helped by further significant fiscal stimu-
lus.
Activity in the transition countries is pro-
jected to decline this year by 1 per cent as in
1998. For next year, little improvement is ex-
pected for this area as a whole, particularly if
the war in Kosovo continues to disrupt trade in
the Balkan region. However, some countries
such as Poland and the Czech Republic may
show a stronger rebound, helped by stronger
export markets in Western Europe. Conditions
in Russia do not favour a revival, although the
fall in production seems to have bottomed out.
Latin America, including Mexico, will re-
main in the doldrums this year, with only little
growth in the region as a whole. But 2000 may
bring a gradual recovery helped by monetary
relaxation and improvements in the terms of
trade if nominal exchange rates rebound and
commodity prices strengthen.
2. World Trade
World trade growth came to halt at the begin-
ning of last year. Trade volumes declined in the
final quarter of 1998, with no noticeable im-
provement in the first quarter of this year. Al-
though world import demand is expected to
pick up from the second quarter at an annu-
alised rate of 6 per cent, calendar year growth
in 1999 is likely to be just 3 per cent, reflecting
the very low level of trade at the start of the
year. Trade volumes are projected to rise by
around 6 per cent in 2000 (Table 2).
The sharp deceleration in world trade growth
was initially due to the fall in demand in South
East Asia, including Japan. In the course of
1998, the slowdown spread to the Middle East,
Russia and Latin America. Figure 1 shows that,
in the years prior to the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis, imports of non-industrial countries
rose at an average rate of about 11 per cent.
The annual growth rate peaked at more than 15
per cent in the autumn of 1997. However, by
the fourth quarter of 1998, import volumes
were 10 per cent lower than a year earlier. This
had a tremendous effect on the total volume of
world trade, as imports of the non-industrial
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countries account for more than one-third of
total world demand. Exports from the industrial
world as a whole actually fell in the last quarter
of 1998. By that time, import growth in the
industrial countries had also come to a stand-
still. European trade was particularly hard hit.
However, trade continued to grow in North
America, reflecting the strong growth in do-
mestic demand.
The year-on-year change in imports into non-
industrial countries has begun to recover since
November last year. This is due entirely to a
revival of demand in South East Asia. Else-
where the fall in imports has continued or just
begun to bottom out. Imports in the industrial
world did not change much in the first months
of this year, with a further increase in the
United States imports counterbalanced by a fur-
ther decline in Western Europe.
We expect a broadening and strengthening of
import demand in the non-industrial countries
from now on, but, given the low level at the
start of the year, average import growth will
still be slightly negative this year. Next year,
imports in the non-industrial countries could in-
crease by 6.5 per cent. Imports in the industrial
countries are forecast to rise by 4.5 to 5 per
cent this year, with a modest acceleration of
growth next year. European imports are ex-
pected to pick up from the second quarter of
this year, but the growth of imports into the
United States is likely to decelerate, and de-
mand is expected to remain weak in Japan.
World trade prices fell sharply last year due
to weak global demand. The prices of many in-
dustrial products and non-oil commodities fell
further in the early part of this year. However,
oil prices have shot up by some 50 per cent fol-
lowing an agreement between major oil produc-
ing countries to limit production. On average,
we assume that oil prices remain at their cur-
rent levels of $15-$ 16 per barrel during the
forecasting period. Raw material prices are ex-
pected to pick up in the course of this year in
reaction to stronger demand, stock reductions
and supply restrictions. Prices of internationally
traded manufactures may remain broadly un-
changed in national currency terms over the
projection period. This implies a small increase
in dollar terms, given the expected depreciation
of the dollar.II. Soft Landing United States
Economy
Economic growth has remained unexpectedly
robust in the United States. Output rose by 1.1
per cent in the first quarter of this year to a
level 4 per cent higher than a year earlier. The
last three years have all seen output growth of
3Vi to 4 per cent, with high resource utilisation
and a rising rate of growth of total factor
productivity, but low, and declining, price
inflation. Private sector demand rose by 5 per
cent in 1998, supported by the wealth effects
generated by the sustained appreciation in
equity prices, and the unemployment rate fell to
its lowest level since 1970. However, inflation,
as measured by the private consumption
deflator, fell further to less than 1 per cent, the
lowest rate since 1955.
We expect to see further growth in GDP
volume of around 3
3A per cent on average this
year, with strong domestic demand. The pace of
the expansion is expected to moderate over the
course of the next year, slowing to around 2V*
per cent in 2000, reflecting tighter monetary
conditions, the impact of the recent declines in
corporate profitability and the gradual dissi-
pation of the wealth effects from the past
growth in equity markets.
The prompt monetary policy response of the
Federal Reserve following the onset of the
financial market crisis last autumn has helped
assuage feared financial market contagion, and
thus helped to maintain the momentum of the
present cyclical expansion. The federal funds
rate was reduced by 75 basis points to 4% %,
and until recently, the financial markets con-
tinued to expect a modest further easing during
the course of this year. This now appears un-
likely. Domestic demand continues to be much
stronger than had been widely expected, sug-
gesting that the labour market will continue to
tighten. The growth of real wages has acceler-
ated over the past 18 months as unemployment
has fallen to below AV2 per cent, although this
has not been reflected in nominal wages be-
cause consumer price inflation has been so low.
The potential for some pick-up in inflation
has been reinforced by the recent strength of oil
prices, which may raise consumer price in-
flation a little. Monetary growth also remains
strong, with broad money (M3) rising by lO
1/^
per cent over the year to the first quarter of
1999, well above the monitoring range of 2 to 6
per cent specified by the Federal Reserve.
The forecast is based on the assumption that
short-term interest rates rise by 50 basis points
by the end of this year, as presently expected by
the financial markets. This will help to
maintain short-term real interest rates at their
current levels at a time when inflation is
expected to have begun to rise. Long-term
interest rates are projected to stabilise at around
5V2 %. Consumer confidence has rebounded
significantly since last autumn, reflecting the
recovery in the stock market since that time,
along with the continued buoyancy of the
domestic economy. This has been reflected in
the recent continued vigour of consumption,
which rose by 1.6 per cent in the first quarter to
a level 5Vi per cent higher than a year earlier.
Housing investment has also expanded rapidly.
The savings ratio is now negative and forecast
to average minus 0.5 per cent this year, with the
volume of consumers' expenditure rising by
5 per cent.
The counterpart to the persistent decline in
the savings ratio has been the climb in the
wealth-income ratio, largely as a result of the
sustained growth in equity prices. If at some
future point the growth rate of asset prices
begins to moderate, or even turns negative, then
a gradual recovery in the savings ratio might be
expected. A turnaround of this sort lies behind
the forecast projections. One key assumption
concerns the future behaviour of equity prices.
The projections assume that they remain flat
throughout the remainder of this year, before
rising in line with the growth of nominal GDP.
This acts to slow the growth of net wealth
relative to incomes, and moderates expenditure
accordingly. The growth rate of consumers'
expenditure is expected to slow to 2Vz per cent
next year. If a more significant drop in equity
prices were to actually occur, then a more
marked slowdown in expenditure over the next
two years could be expected. The consequencesof a collapse in equity prices are explored in
Chapter VI of this report.
Business investment remains robust, rising
by 1.8 per cent in the first quarter of 1999 after
growth of 11% per cent last year. The presently
high spare capacity in the industrial sector and
weak corporate profits are likely to reduce the
growth of investment next year. The economy
continues to enjoy the beneficial supply-side
effects from the rapid expansion in fixed in-
vestment over the past five years, with the net
stock of fixed capital having risen by nearly
13 per cent in real terms since the end of 1993.
This has raised the capital-labour ratio and ex-
panded the production possibility frontier of the
economy. The Federal Reserve has acted to ac-
commodate this development by holding inter-
est rates lower than they otherwise might have
been at a time of rising resource utilisation.
Labour productivity rose by 2V* per cent last
year, the fastest growth since the pro-cyclical
pick-up in 1992 when the economy was emerg-
ing from recession. Over the past three years,
labour productivity growth has averaged 2 per
cent per annum, well above the trend of 1 to 1V4
per cent observed over the previous two de-
cades. This is consistent with the view that the
recent strength of fixed investment and the
consequent rise in the capital-labour ratio has
helped to raise potential output per worker. To
the extent that this investment has also em-
bodied new technologies it may also have af-
fected the potential rate of technical progress.
If the steady state rate of technical progress has
risen, then it should be possible to sustain
higher utilisation rates than in the past without
adding significantly to inflationary pressures.
There is too little evidence, however, to evalu-
ate this hypothesis with any degree of con-
fidence at present.
The recent strength of labour productivity is
certainly unusual at a time when many workers
with relatively low levels of productivity are
being brought into employment. We expect la-
bour productivity to rise by around 1% per cent
this year, and by an average IV* per cent over
the next five years, implying gradual conver-
gence of production on a higher level of poten-
tial output rather than a permanently higher
trend rate of growth that would allow the pres-
ent rate of labour utilisation to be sustained.
There are some signs of a modest upturn
in inflationary pressures in recent months, al-
though to date this primarily reflects move-
ments in energy prices and special factors. The
private consumption deflator rose by just 0.25
per cent in the first quarter, after growth of 0.8
per cent in 1998. Energy prices rose by more
than 20 per cent in March, whilst aggregate im-
port prices have begun to stabilise after falling
by more than 6 per cent last year. Some in-
crease in import prices is to be expected over
the next year if the dollar begins to weaken. On
balance, some pick-up in price inflation is ex-
pected this year and next, with inflation moving
back into line with the growth of domestic
costs. Unit labour costs are projected to rise by
2Vi per cent this year, broadly in line with their
growth in 1997 and 1998. In conjunction with
higher import prices, this may raise consumer
price inflation to around 2'/2 per cent in 2000.
The current account moved further into def-
icit last year, rising to 2.7 per cent of GDP from
1.9 per cent of GDP in 1997. The volume of
exported goods and services rose by just IVz
per cent last year. Trading conditions remained
subdued in the first quarter of 1999, with the
volume of merchandise exports declining by
3 per cent, m contrast, strong domestic demand
acted to raise import volumes by a further 3 per
cent. Net exports are projected to reduce GDP
by 1.2 percentage points this year, as in 1998,
with the current account deficit widening to
average 3Vi per cent of GDP over the next two
years. The increase in the current account defi-
cit reflects the trends in the financial deficit of
the private sector, which is now higher than at
any time in the last 35 years. This is unlikely to
be sustained indefinitely, as it would imply a
continuing build-up of net foreign liabilities by
United States residents and an ever higher
burden of debt interest payments overseas. Net
overseas liabilities are expected to rise to
around 25 per cent of GDP by the end of 2000
from 9V4 per cent of GDP in 1995. It is quite
possible that there will be a relatively smooth
adjustment of the present imbalances, with
growth easing to just below trend levels for ashort time. However, there is a growing risk
that the adjustment could be more severe, with
a rapid correction of the dollar exchange rate,
and increasing political pressures for the im-
plementation of barriers to trade.
III. No Recovery yet for Japan
The economic situation in Japan remains de-
pressed, with nominal GDP continuing to fall.
In real terms, output declined by nearly 3 per
cent last year, the largest annual drop in the
post-war period. There are signs that recent fis-
cal initiatives have begun to stabilise the econ-
omy this year. However, with external and pri-
vate sector demand expected to remain weak,
output is forecast to fall further this year by 1 to
IV2 per cent. Firms have finally begun to tackle
excess capacity and excess labour. Ultimately,
this should help to create the conditions for a
more firmly based recovery, but in the short
term, it can only add to the downward pressures
on activity. We do not presently expect to see
any significant growth in the Japanese economy
next year.
Activity is currently supported by the impact
of the fiscal policy measures introduced last
year, although these have been partially crowd-
ed out by higher long-term interest rates. The
"emergency economic measures" announced
last November were worth 4% per cent of GDP
if implemented in full. These came on top of
the initiatives worth around 3V4 per cent of
GDP announced last April. Together, these
packages have expanded public investment sig-
nificantly and will eventually lower direct
taxes. We expect a significant rise of 12V2 per
cent (equivalent to 1.1 per cent of GDP) in the
volume of public investment this year. The
general government budget deficit is projected
to rise from an estimated 6 per cent of GDP in
1998 to 8V2 per cent this year and 10 per cent of
GDP in 2000. A supplementary budget may be
necessary this autumn in order to prevent any
decline in the volume of public expenditure
next year.
Significant public financial support of up to
60 trillion yen (12 per cent of GDP) has also
been made available to help support the finan-
cial system. The schemes should help to grad-
ually restore public confidence and ease the
present credit contraction taking place, al-
though it is likely to take some time before the
bad debt problem is over and private sector
confidence is restored.
The Bank of Japan reduced the overnight call
rate to 0.15 % in February. Although there is
little sign yet that the bank is about to em-
bark on a programme of sustained monetary
expansion, a number of measures has been
adopted to boost market liquidity and ease the
financial constraints faced by many companies.
Monetary growth is already robust given the
present contraction in the level of nominal ac-
tivity in the economy, with broad money rising
by 3Vz per cent over the year to January. Capital
markets have stabilised since the turn of the
year, and equity prices have begun to recover.
However, monetisation cannot be excluded as it
remains one of the few possible policy options
if the economy fails to recover. The appreci-
ation of the yen since last summer has helped to
tighten overall monetary conditions, with the
real effective exchange rate presently some 10
per cent higher than a year ago.
There is now widespread price deflation in
Japan. Wholesale and consumer prices both fell
in the first quarter of 1999. The appreciation of
the yen has been reflected in import prices,
which were some 12% per cent lower in the
first quarter of this year than a year earlier. Al-
though higher energy costs should push up in-
put costs this year, this will not suffice to raise
the price of finished goods and services in the
absence of any significant strengthening in de-
mand. Consumer prices are projected to fall by
0.3 per cent this year and 0.2 per cent in 2000.
The March Tankan survey reported a modest
upturn in business sentiment in both the manu-
facturing and non-manufacturing sectors, re-
flecting the impact of the injection of public
funds into the banking sector and the expansion
in public investment. The recent rebound in
equity prices may help to ease financial pres-
sures on the corporate sector, with profits esti-mated to have fallen by around 25 per cent
last year. However, there seems little prospect
of any imminent pick-up in expenditure. Many
businesses have begun to restructure their oper-
ations, with inevitable short-term implications
for domestic activity. Business sector fixed in-
vestment declined by 11V4 per cent last year.
Leading indicators suggest that private sector
investment will remain weak throughout the
coming months. In the six months to February,
new orders for machinery were I6V2 per cent
lower than a year earlier. Investment intentions
remain weak, and the number of firms reporting
excess capacity continued to rise in the March
Tankan survey. We expect to see a further sig-
nificant decline in the volume of business in-
vestment this year, with, at best, a stabilisation
in 2000.
Labour market conditions have continued to
deteriorate in recent months, with the unem-
ployment rate rising to a new post-war peak. In
the three months to February, total employment
was 1 per cent lower than a year earlier. This
small decline disguises the steps firms have
taken to reduce costs, with hours worked and
wages having been reduced, and many jobs
being made part-time. Total nominal labour
compensation per employee is projected to de-
cline by 1V4 per cent in 1999 and a further
% per cent next year. Total employment is pro-
jected to decline by 1V4 per cent this year and
next, with the unemployment rate averaging
more than 5 per cent in 2000. The fall in em-
ployment is likely to have a significant impact
on income growth and expected job security in
the coming months, and hence on private sector
expenditure. Real disposable incomes are ex-
pected to fall by up to 1 per cent this year,
following an estimated decline of V2 per cent
last year. Consumer confidence remains sub-
dued, and monthly household surveys provide
little indication of any pick-up in expenditure
so far this year. Housing starts have also de-
clined further. Consumers' expenditure is fore-
cast to fall by V2 per cent this year, with housing
investment declining by 6V2 per cent.
External demand was also weak last year,
although despite the downturn in many of
Japan's major export markets in Asia, net ex-
ports still raised GDP by 0.7 percentage points
last year. Weak domestic demand led to a large
drop in import volumes, more than offsetting
the decline in export volumes. Although export
market growth is expected to pick up a little
this year, the rise in the real exchange rate since
the middle of last year is likely to constrain
export growth. The current account surplus is
expected to remain around 3 to 3Vi per cent of
GDP this year and next.
IV. European Economic Policies
1. Fiscal Policy
The fears about the sustainability of the fiscal
adjustments that some countries made to meet
the requirements for joining the European
Monetary Union have begun to disappear. In
1998, all EMU member states succeeded in
keeping the budget deficit within the 3 per cent
limit, consolidating the 1997 results with a
more or less neutral fiscal stance. However,
over the last year the situation has changed.
Economic growth has been affected to a sur-
prising extent by the turmoil in emerging mar-
kets. Political priorities have also changed, with
the biggest European countries all now having
centre-left governments. It is not yet clear
which policies these governments will choose
to undertake in the present circumstances, al-
though we do not expect that they will question
the principles of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Fiscal measures will be used to stimulate re-
covery and employment, but without expanding
structural deficits. For the countries with a high
debt-to-GDP ratio, like Italy and Belgium, there
is little room for manoeuvre, due to the need to
ensure further reductions in the debt burden as
soon as possible.
At the beginning of this year, all EMU coun-
tries presented stability programmes in which
the ratio of the general government net borrow-
ing to GDP was planned to be reduced over the
next two years. These plans will be jeopardised
by the lower-than-expected economic growth in10
Europe. We expect that governments will let
automatic stabilisers work and accept that the
budget deficits for 1999 will be higher than an-
nounced in order to avoid prolonging the down-
turn through an unnecessarily restrictive fiscal
stance. We expect the deficit-to-GDP ratio to
be around 2 per cent for the euro area as a
whole this year. It has to be noted, however,
that in some countries, like France and Italy,
the deficit probably will remain at or above
2.5 per cent. In other countries, like Austria and
Germany, the deficit will still be close to 2 per
cent, hi 2000, the reduction of the deficit
should gain momentum if the expected eco-
nomic upswing occurs. If it does not, then these
countries could find themselves in danger of
breaching the requirements of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Outside the euro area, the fiscal policy stance
differs across countries. While in the United
Kingdom, policy is supporting demand this
year and next (even if the net tax burden has
been increased), it is quite restrictive in Den-
mark and, to a lesser extent, in Sweden.
One important challenge facing the euro area
is the high level of unemployment in most
member countries. Numerous studies show that
a reduction in unemployment needs several fac-
tors. Faster economic growth can help bring
unemployment back towards its structural level,
but it is not enough if the structural level itself
has to be reduced. For this, active consideration
needs to be given to labour and capital market
reforms, a reduction in labour taxes and longer-
term measures such as investment in human
capital, education and R&D.
In the short term, employment growth is like-
ly to weaken, and many governments have little
scope to support private demand or increase
public investment in infrastructure due to bud-
get constraints. If unemployment is not to rise
once more, national governments need to im-
plement structural labour market reforms as
soon as possible. Measures should also be
taken to reform the tax system. Structural re-
forms take time to be realised and time to pro-
duce effects on the economy. Without them, em-
ployment growth is likely to prove disappoint-
ing if a cyclical upswing begins to take place.
2. On the Stability and Growth
Programmes
In the summer of 1997, the Stability and
Growth Pact was ratified in an attempt to pre-
vent member states from pursuing unsustain-
able fiscal policies after the start of the third
stage of EMU. It was feared that without such
a constraint on national fiscal policies, there
could eventually be pressures on the European
Central Bank to reduce the real value of an
ever-expanding stock of euro-denominated pub-
lic debt through inflation, despite the existence
of a "no-bailout clause" in the Maastricht
Treaty. The commitment to the Stability Pact
might also help to reduce political pressures for
individual governments to pursue expansionary
policies that would eventually lead to insolven-
cy. The Stability and Growth Pact calls on gov-
ernments to aim for balanced budgets or even a
surplus over the longer term. To enforce sus-
tainable fiscal policies, a mechanism was intro-
duced which threatens the imposition of finan-
cial penalties if the budget deficit exceeds 3 per
cent of GDP, unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances such as a severe recession. It was
also agreed that governments submit Stability
and Growth Programmes with medium-term
projections of fiscal developments to the Euro-
pean Commission and the Council of Finance
Ministers. This allows the Commission to
assess whether fiscal policies comply with the
Maastricht Treaty.
All countries
1 have now submitted their first
reports with projections up until 2002. These
reports are supposed to be updated annually.
The table presents key figures from the cur-
rent programmes. Finland, Ireland, Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom already had
a budget surplus last year. All plan to have a
surplus in 2002 as well. Spain is the only coun-
try that plans to move from a budget deficit to a
surplus over this period. In most other coun-
tries, the budget deficit is projected to decline
to around 1 per cent of GDP, although the
The Stability and Growth Programmes of Italy and
Ireland and the convergence programme of Sweden
only cover the period until 2001.11

























































































aIn per cent of GDP. — ''Average annual growth rate. — Taken from the Stability and Growth



















































Programmes or the respective commission
Dotential output estimated with Hodrick-Prescott filter. -
until 2001 only. — Cautious scenario. The Stability and Growth Programme
- "Projection
of the Netherlands' government includes three different
scenarios based on average annual GDP growth of 2.25, 2.75 and 3.25 per cent, respectively.
Source: OECD; European Commission; Stability and Growth Programmes; own calculations and estimates.
Austrian government views a deficit of 1.5 per
cent of GDP as sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the Stability and Growth Pact. The
resulting deficit for the euro area as a whole
would be about 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2002,
compared to 2.3 per cent last year (Table 3).
It is important to focus on the structural, cy-
clically adjusted budget balance, since fiscal
consolidation is defined as a reduction of the
structural deficit. Several governments assume
a rate of GDP growth above that achieved in
the recent past and above what is generally con-
sidered to be the long-term potential rate of
growth. This is quite possible, particularly in
economies with a negative output gap at pres-
ent, but in these countries, structural deficits
will decline by less than the headline deficits.
Furthermore, the European Commission has
noted that some of these projections seem to be
optimistic in light of the recent downward re-
visions to GDP growth this year. Consequently,
there appears to be a reasonable chance at
present that some of the official targets in the
programmes will be missed if further fiscal
measures are not introduced.
It also matters whether fiscal consolidation is
achieved by restraining expenditures or by rais-
ing taxes. The latter may lower medium-term
growth if higher taxes and social contributions
have detrimental effects on capital accumu-
lation and work effort. Experience shows that a
consolidation that relies on expenditure reduc-
tion is more likely to be successful.
2
In all countries for which relevant informa-
tion has been made available, public expendi-
tures are projected to rise more slowly than
GDP, albeit only slightly in some cases. In a
number of countries, this follows a significant
reduction in the ratio of expenditure to GDP
between 1994 and 1998. Revenues have risen
relative to GDP in many countries in recent
years to help bring budget deficits down below
3 per cent of GDP. In the period until 2002,
the revenue-to-GDP ratio is generally projected
However, it may matter which kind of expenditures
are cut. Lower public consumption is likely to bring
greater benefits than lower public investment. In
Europe, between 1990 and 1997, most countries have
cut public investment considerably while other ex-
penditures (public consumption, subsidies and trans-
fers) have often continued to rise in relation to GDP.12
to decline gradually. Thus, the balance of the
medium-term consolidation programmes ap-
pears appropriate. However, the actual policies
pursued so far raise concerns that the medium-
term objectives may not be met. For example,
we do not expect to see a significant reduction
in the ratio of public expenditure to GDP in
France or Germany this year.
The Maastricht Treaty requires fiscal poli-
cies to be sustainable. Sustainability is indi-
cated by a primary budget surplus of sufficient
size to stabilise or lower the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The stability programmes show the debt ratio
declining in all countries between 1998 and
2001/02. However, there are some important
differences between countries. In some, notably
Ireland, Finland, Spain, Denmark and Sweden,
the debt ratio is declining rapidly; in others,
such as Germany and France, comparatively
little progress is projected. Consequently, the
fiscal policies in the Stability and Growth Pro-
grammes are not likely to bring a marked re-
duction in the debt-to-GDP ratio for the overall
euro area, with gross public debt projected to
remain well above 60 per cent of GDP in 2002.
Italy and Belgium will still have debt stocks
larger than their annual GDP. The Netherlands
may also have a debt stock in excess of 60 per
cent of GDP, at least under their cautious
growth scenario.
Thus, the current stance of fiscal policy in
the euro area does not appear to comply fully
with the principles of the Maastricht Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact, mainly due to
limited consolidation efforts in the major mem-
ber states. Even slow progress is contingent on
a rather benign macroeconomic environment. In
contrast, in some of the smaller countries, con-
solidation has progressed much further and ap-
pears much more soundly based.
3. Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
At the start of the European Monetary Union
on January 1, 1999, monetary conditions were
quite favourable in the euro area. Long-term
interest rates had come down to about 4 % with
practically no differences between the individu-
al countries. On average, this implied an ex-
pected real rate of approximately 2Vz %, as-
suming that the European Central Bank (ECB)
was expected to hold inflation at VA per cent.
For several countries this was even a historical
low, as many had experienced long periods
with considerable risk premia due to inflation-
ary risks and uncertainties about possible cur-
rency devaluation. But even for those econ-
omies where such premia had not existed, such
as Germany and the Netherlands, the real rate
was below the historical average. Similarly,
short-term money market rates had converged
to a level slightly above 3 %, following the co-
ordinated cut of key interest rates by the Euro-
pean central banks in December 1998; they
were thus about one percentage point lower
than a year before. Short-term real interest rates
in the euro area were thus about 2 %, nearly
three-quarters of a percentage point lower than
a year earlier. Again this was unusually low for
most countries. Monetary and credit aggregates
expanded quite rapidly. Monetary conditions
were eased further during the first quarter of
this year with the euro depreciating significant-
ly against currencies of major non-EMU coun-
tries.
Yet on April 8, 1999, the Governing Council
of the ECB decided to reduce the interest rate
on its main refinancing operations by half a
percentage point to 2Vz %. This first and strong
action of the ECB was rather surprising and
hard to interpret given the previous statements
of the ECB and the improvement in monetary
conditions that had already occurred. The dif-
ficulty facing the ECB is to explain its mone-
tary policy on the basis of a rather uncertain set
of indicators and in a transitory context of pos-
sible instability of money demand in the euro
area. These circumstances were generally ex-
pected to induce rather cautious behaviour by
the central bank. This suggests that additional
changes in the operating procedures of the ECB
are required in order to improve the transpar-
ency of monetary policy decisions.
On October 13, 1998, the Governing Council
of the ECB announced the main elements of the
stability-oriented monetary policy of the euro
system. It announced a reference value for theA k» institufs fur Welfrwirfgeki
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growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate
M3 of 4
1/2 per cent per annum. It was the only
quantitative indicator explicitly stated. During
the first months of 1999, the 12-month growth
rate of the broad money aggregate was around
5 per cent. At the same time, the total amount
of credit increased at an annual rate of more
than 7 per cent. The ECB indicated that it feels
entitled to take into account special circum-
stances which may temporarily push monetary
growth away from the reference level, as other
monetary authorities have chosen to do in the
past. For example, part of the growth in M3
appeared to be related to the considerable rise
in land and housing prices in a few euro area
countries. Another possible factor mentioned in
the April Bulletin of the ECB is the demand for
credit by non-financial corporations in order to
finance inventories, which, according to busi-
ness survey data, have increased to above-
normal levels. So the formulation of the appro-
priate monetary policy stance is conducted
using discretionary interpretations.
One possible model of the link between
short-term interest rates and macroeconomic
variables is provided by the Taylor Rule. A
number of studies have shown that such a rule
can approximate the behaviour of the German
Bundesbank since the late 1970s. However,
such a rule does not appear to fit with the pres-
ent policy stance of the ECB. If we consider the
ECB behaviour according to this rule, with an
output gap for the euro area of around 1 per
cent (as is estimated by the OECD, for ex-
ample), 2 to 2'/2 per cent real GDP medium-
term growth (which the euro system considers a
consensual estimate of the potential output
growth), an implicit inflation target of \Vi per
cent and an equilibrium real rate of 3 per cent,
then, with inflation at 1 per cent, the appro-
priate short-term interest rate might be 3 % or
even higher. Here, we assume that the respec-
tive weights for the deviations of inflation and
output from their respective targets are the
same. The present level of short-term interest
rates might suggest that either the ECB esti-
mates the output gap to be at least 2 per cent, or
that it expects that the equilibrium real interest
rate reverts toward levels last seen in the 1960s.
However, the ECB reports are not very con-
clusive on either point. In its first Annual Re-
port published in March 1999, the ECB indi-
cated that the euro area unemployment was
largely of a structural nature, caused by factors
"of an institutional and regulatory character".
This suggests that the present output gap is
thought to be small. In its April Bulletin the
central bank indicated that the output gap
"cannot be used as a summary measure for
guiding monetary policy decisions" because its
size cannot be determined with the necessary
level of precision, and estimates differ quite
significantly across institutions. Although the
ECB notes that "since the beginning of the
1990s the euro area economy has been growing
somewhat below, rather than above, trend", it
admits that this situation of excess productive
capacity has been declining over the past two
years. All in all, it appears unlikely that the
ECB thinks that the output gap is large.
It is also difficult to interpret the ECB's
policy because of a lack of clear information
about their assessment of future inflationary
pressures. The ECB does not follow a strategy
of inflation targeting in a strict sense like the
Bank of England or the Swedish Riksbank.
Nevertheless, its strategy has similar principles,
and the assessment of inflation perspectives
must be communicated with the public if policy
decisions are to be understood. After all, the
expectations of economic agents had to be
stabilised, and it would be helpful if they had
the same information as the ECB and knew the
underlying model that is being used.
The first problem of communication has
been the precise value of the target for in-
flation. This has been quite obscure for a while
because at first, there was only an upper limit
("below 2 per cent") for the increase of the
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP);
then, there appeared to be a target range be-
tween 0 and 2 per cent, and then an indication
that the floor was above zero because of mea-
surement biases in the price index. Being at
either the top or the bottom of the band is likely
to be regarded as less desirable than being to-
ward the middle, but the value which would
imply a symmetric reaction of the ECB has not14
been stated. The second problem is due to the
fact that the ECB — unlike other central banks
that have an explicit inflation target — does not
publish its inflation forecast. For example, the
recent cut in the key interest rate could have
been justified by an explicit statement that the
inflation forecast was revised downwards, with
an associated reduction in the probability that it
would exceed 2 per cent in the next two years.
All in all, the policy is therefore less trans-
parent than it could be, making it unnecessarily
difficult for the ECB to establish its credibility.
The ECB will have to follow closely the de-
velopment of the business cycle and the pros-
pects for inflation in the euro area. There are
signs that there has been a turnaround in busi-
ness sentiment and that activity in the euro area
may gain momentum. Also, the inflation rate
has probably passed its trough unless further
unexpected deflationary shocks occur. How-
ever, the acceleration so far is mainly due to
arise in volatile prices — in particular oil
prices — and not due to an increase of the core
rate which is more relevant for inflation per-
formance and thus, presumably, for the policy
decisions of the ECB. In the course of this year
and also in 2000, the inflation rate is likely
to pick up somewhat as the cyclical upturn
strengthens; we expect core inflation to rise
slightly to around \Vi per cent, with the aggre-
gate HICP for the euro area rising by 1.4 per
cent next year. If this occurs, the ECB will have
to act and raise interest rates in time to be
credible in its anti-inflationary stance. We ex-
pect to see short-term interest rates rise by
about half a percentage point, reversing the cut
made this April. Such a move would not be
unduly restrictive because real interest rates
would remain more or less the same. For the
euro area, a short-term interest rate of 3 to
3Vi % must still be viewed as accommodative,
given a longer-term inflation target of P/2 per
cent as implied, for example, in the reference
path for money growth. Long-term interest
rates in the euro area are expected to rise from
4 to 4V* % at present to 4Vi % next year. The
exchange rate of the euro should strengthen
against the dollar, helped by the expected cycli-
cal development in the euro area relative to that
in the United States.
V. Temporary Slowdown in
Europe
Real GDP in the euro area rose by 2.7 per cent
(ESA 95 data) last year. Growth was a little
weaker in Western Europe as a whole than in
the euro area, with a slowdown in the United
Kingdom and Norway and a subdued recovery
in Switzerland offsetting further strong growth
in Greece and Sweden. Domestic demand in the
euro area was particularly strong, helped by the
easing of monetary policy, wealth effects from
rising equity and house prices and an appre-
ciation in the terms of trade. In contrast, the
volume of net exports declined for the first time
since 1991 due to weak demand outside the in-
dustrial countries and the appreciation of many
European currencies against the dollar. Labour
market conditions improved, with employment
rising by 1.3 per cent and the standardised un-
employment rate declining by 0.6 percentage
points. Nevertheless, inflation slowed, largely
due to the fall in global commodity prices.
Harmonised consumer prices rose by 1.1 per
cent last year, after rising by 1.6 per cent in
1997. Excluding the most volatile components,
food and energy, core inflation averaged Wi per
cent and slowed towards the end of the year.
The reduction in unemployment and the ces-
sation of fiscal tightening helped sustain con-
sumer confidence and private consumption ex-
penditure. In turn, stable inflation, the recovery
in consumers' expenditure and the low cost of
capital supported corporate investment for
much of last year. However, growth slowed sig-
nificantly in the fourth quarter of 1998. Export
volumes and government expenditure both de-
clined. This will also constrain calendar year
growth in 1999.
The impact of the financial crisis in the de-
veloping countries has varied across the Euro-
pean economies. Italy and Germany have been
particularly affected. In other countries, notably15
Spain and the United Kingdom, strong domes-
tic demand pushed up imports significantly. A
decline in net exports reduced growth by more
than 1 percentage point last year in Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom. A number of smaller
economies, notably Portugal, Denmark and to a
lesser extent Belgium, also experienced a large
decline in net exports.
There continues to be a marked divergence
between industrial and consumer confidence.
Industrial confidence has declined since the
middle of 1998, largely due to a fall in new
orders, especially from foreign markets. Indus-
trial production fell sharply at the end of last
year, but has now begun to stabilise. We expect
that this downturn will act to slow corporate
investment this year. In contrast, consumer con-
fidence continued to improve in the latter half
of 1998 and the beginning of this year. Higher
employment, low inflation and the good per-
formance of the stock market have helped to
improve current and expected future incomes.
However, the most recent monthly figures for
April show consumer confidence moderating a
little. Industrial confidence stabilised, possibly
reflecting somewhat brighter prospects for ex-
ports.
We expect euro area GDP to rise by around
2 per cent this year, driven by continued growth
of 2V2-3 per cent in France and Spain (Table 4).
Growth in Italy and Germany is expected to be
much weaker, with GDP rising by under IVi per
cent. The long lasting effects of the severe
fiscal restrictions needed to join EMU can part-
ly account for the present poor performance of
the Italian economy. Whilst interest rates have
fallen significantly, this has a limited impact on
the household sector because of the correspond-
ing decline in investment income. The relative
weakness of the German economy is mainly
due to the poor performance of exports. Uncer-
tainty about future government policies may
also have added to the cautious behaviour of
investors.



























































































































aThe GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of European country GDPs.16
External demand remained weak in the first
part of this year, but is expected to strengthen
in the latter half of the year. The recent im-
provement in monetary conditions, both from
the reductions in interest rates over the past
year and the recent depreciation of the euro,
should also begin to support demand. This is
already visible in the equity markets. In many
countries these have more than recouped their
losses from last autumn. The accommodative
monetary stance and the low cost of capital is
already helping to boost the construction sector
significantly. An expected recovery in final de-
mand, along with the possibility of future rises
in commodity prices, may also help to support
inventory levels. Private consumption should
also be supported by growth in real disposable
incomes. Many governments are expected to
postpone further fiscal tightening, at least until
growth picks up and real wages are expected
to increase. Employment growth is, however,
expected to be modest, in spite of the Employ-
ment Action Plans now introduced in many
countries, with the euro area unemployment
rate expected to decline only modestly in the
near future.
One uncertainty in our projections lies in the
future course of stockbuilding. This contributed
about 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in
the euro area last year, according to Eurostat
data. At face value this is consistent with some
observed weakness in final demand in some
countries, particularly in the manufacturing sec-
tor, leading to an unintended build-up of stock
levels. This, in turn, would normally lead to a
period of destocking with a depressing effect
on production. However, we do not expect this
to occur. In many countries the data for inven-
tories include any statistical discrepancies in
the national accounts. These discrepancies ap-
pear to account for most of the recorded build-
up of stocks last year, especially in countries
such as Germany and Austria.
In the first three months of this year, in-
flation in the euro area was approximately 1 per
cent, as measured by the HICP. Core inflation
may have slowed further since the end of last
year. The recent rise of oil prices and the de-
preciation of the euro will, however, generate a
slight increase in consumer prices. Inflation is
expected to average around 1 per cent this year,
and 1.4 per cent in 2000.
Of the European countries outside EMU, the
United Kingdom appears increasingly unlikely
to experience any significant further downturn;
in the first quarter of 1999, GDP remained at
the level of the preceding quarter. Business and
consumer confidence have begun to pick up,
helped by the significant easing of 2V4 percent-
age points in the short-term interest rates since
the autumn of last year. Growth is expected to
recover slightly and to return to trend in the
year 2000. Some risks of renewed inflationary
pressure are present, especially if the British
pound depreciates significantly against the
euro. The government appears well on course
to meet its fiscal objectives of avoiding a defi-
cit on the current balance and keeping its net
indebtedness below 40 per cent of GDP.
GDP growth slowed in Sweden at the end of
last year due to weak exports, as in most Euro-
pean countries. However, past declines in the
Swedish real effective exchange rate helped to
offset the downturn in external demand to some
extent. GDP growth is expected to be approxi-
mately 2V4 per cent this year, led by private
consumption. Inflation is very low, with harmo-
nised consumer prices rising by 0.5 per cent in
the year to March, and the overall consumer
price index is expected to remain within the
central bank target band (2 per cent with a
fluctuation band of +/- 1 per cent). Last year's
large budget surplus of over 2 per cent of GDP
is not expected to be repeated this year because
further postponements of expenditure seem un-
likely. Nevertheless, the surplus is likely to re-
main above 1 per cent of GDP.
Growth is expected to slow significantly in
Denmark this year to a little over V/i per cent.
New fiscal measures are expected to slow the
growth of private consumption, and exports
have been significantly affected by the down-
turn in external demand and domestic labour
disruptions. Confidence also fell sharply when
interest rates were raised last autumn as the
currency came under pressure in the foreign ex-
change markets. However, rates have subse-
quently been reduced significantly, and this17
Box: Will European Inflation Exceed 2 Per Cent Next Year?
In forming judgements about the appropriate monetary stance for the euro area, the ECB needs also to form a
judgement about the probability that euro area inflation might exceed its target band. One method of assessing the
uncertainty around the central inflation forecast is to look at the errors made in past forecasts of European-wide
inflation. At present, this can be done only for forecasts of inflation for the European Union rather than the euro
area. For instance, the standard deviation of the errors made by the OECD in their spring forecasts of the year-ahead
growth in the EU private consumption deflator for 1991-1998 is 0.52 percentage points. We look at this short
sample as it covers a period of low inflation in all the major European economies, even though they could all have
different monetary policies. Assuming that the distributions of past errors are normal, a rule of thumb is that a 70 per
cent confidence interval can be obtained by adding a range of one standard error around the central forecast.
Our central forecast for the rate of harmonised consumer price inflation in the euro area next year is 1.4 per cent.
By looking up in standard statistical tables the probability that a standard normal variant is greater than
(2 - 1.4)/0.52, we find just a 10 per cent chance that inflation will exceed the top of the ECB's range for price
stability. There is a negligible chance at present of inflation being negative, given recent forecasting errors. As being
right at the top of the range is likely to be regarded undesirable by the ECB, it is also of interest to ask what the
chances are of exceeding a rate such as 1% per cent. We would put this at close to 20 per cent at present.
should help to prevent a sharper slowdown. Un-
employment has fallen significantly in recent
years, but much of this appears to be attribut-
able to structural reforms, and we do not expect
inflation to rise above W* per cent in the near
future.
Growth remains much stronger in Greece.
GDP rose by y/i per cent last year, and we ex-
pect a further rise of at least 3 per cent this
year. Demand has been led by strong invest-
ment, supported by structural funds from the
European Commission. This has more than off-
set the short-term demand effects from fiscal
consolidation. However, the war in Kosovo is
likely to have an effect on Greece, disrupting
supply routes and reducing earnings from tour-
ism. This may reduce growth by up to half a
percentage point next year.
VI. What Happens if Equity
Markets Collapse?
An important risk surrounding our short-term
forecasts lies in the behaviour of equity prices.
Equity markets are stronger in almost all indus-
trialised economies than they were at the be-
ginning of the year, and significantly stronger
than they were two years ago, except in Japan.
Prices have risen by over 50 per cent in the
United States, the United Kingdom, France and
Germany since that time. Prices in Italy and
Spain have doubled, partly reflecting sharper
declines in long-term interest rates. The wealth
effects arising from this real appreciation in
equity prices are continuing to help support pri-
vate sector demand.
Movements in equity markets depend by
identity on changes in expected earnings and
changes in the valuation placed on those earn-
ings. The valuation depends on changes in the
risk-free rate (the long-term government bond
yield) and the equity risk premium. It is dif-
ficult to account for the renewed vigour of
United States stock markets since the start of
this year. By early May, prices had risen by
about 20 per cent, in spite of a rise of nearly
1 percentage point in long-term bond yields. As
there seems to be little grounds for assuming
a faster rate of growth in nominal earnings
than previously expected, unless more investors
have come to believe that there has been a
technological revolution that has permanently
raised the growth rate, there would appear to
have been a further decline in the risk premium.
However, the IMF noted last year that implied
risk premiums were already low by long-term
standards. This raises the possibility that there
might be a sudden correction in equity markets,
either because earnings turn out to be weaker
than expected and the present bubble bursts, or
because the monetary authorities are forced to
raise interest rates significantly as inflationary
pressures emerge.18
Any substantive correction in prices would
be likely to have a marked adverse effect on the
short-term economic outlook, given the extent
to which consumers' expenditure and, poten-
tially, corporate investment are presently driven
by the gains arising from rising stock market
valuations. We examine the short-term global
economic implications of two separate sce-
narios. In the first one, US equity prices are re-
duced by 20 per cent in the first period of the
simulation, but then allowed to subsequently
adjust endogenously to reflect the induced pol-
icy response of the monetary authorities. This
means that prices remain below their base
levels for some years, but ultimately adjust
back towards their baseline trajectory, hi the
second scenario, we explore the consequences
of a simultaneous 20 per cent drop in global
equity markets. The responses to such a shock
may in part be model-dependent, reflecting dif-
ferences in the monetary and fiscal policies
which particular models assume in response to
such a shock. We thus report responses using
two different models, the National Institute
Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) and the
MIMOSA model maintained by OFCE. One
important difference in the two models is
that NiGEM is a quarterly model whereas
MIMOSA is an annual one. Hence, the full
shock persists for one year in the latter, but is
partially offset by looser monetary policy in the
former within the course of the first year.
The NiGEM model, in which agents are pre-
sumed to be forward-looking, assumes that both
the Federal Reserve and the ECB set monetary
policy to target some combination of nominal
GDP (or equivalently the money stock) and
consumer price inflation. Short-term interest
rates adjust in relation to the difference be-
tween targets and actual outcomes. Hence, any
shock that is expected to slow down activity
should have its effects partly offset by the auto-
matic shock absorbers in the financial system.
This particular monetary rule is consistent with
the mixed framework that is presently being
used by the ECB. Nominal targeting combined
with inflation targeting provides a framework
for conducting monetary policy in which de-
cisions are guided by the deviation of inflation
from some target level as well as the deviation
of a nominal magnitude from its baseline trajec-
tory. The inclusion of the inflation component
in the rule raises the sensitivity of interest rates
in NiGEM in response to deflationary shocks.
In contrast, the MIMOSA model does not em-
body forward-looking behaviour, so that agents
adjust more slowly and changes in demand take
longer to emerge in inflation. The monetary
policy rule also differs from that used in the
NiGEM analysis, with the authorities assumed
to base their judgements on a Taylor Rule.
These two separate econometric models thus
encompass a wide range of possible models,
and can provide some indication of the likely
Table 5: The Impact of a 20 Per Cent Fall in US Equity Prices — Difference from Baseline
GDP (percentage points)
Consumer price inflation (percentage points)
Short-term interest rates (percentage points)
Dollar exchange rate (per cent)
a
World trade volume (per cent)




































Table 6: The Impact of a 20 Per Cent Fall in Global Equity Prices — Difference from Baseline
GDP (percentage points)
Consumer price inflation (percentage points)
Short-term interest rates (percentage points)
Dollar exchange rate (per cent)"





































































sensitivity of any conclusions about the short-
run impact of an equity price collapse.
Any given decline in equity prices will have
more effect on private sector net financial
wealth in the United States than elsewhere, in
part because of the greater importance of equi-
ties in American private sector portfolios. In
countries such as Germany, more wealth is held
in bonds (directly or indirectly), and hence a
fall in equity prices which generates a short-
term monetary response and an associated fall
in long-term rates has its effects partially offset
by the rise in bond prices. This offset is larger,
the more bonds are held as a proportion of the
portfolio.
The responses to a collapse in US equity
prices alone are summarised in Table 5. Both
models give similar first year effects, with GDP
of the United States declining by close to 1 per
cent. The euro area and Japan cannot remain
immune from developments elsewhere in the
world economy. The fall in American equity
prices reduces growth in Europe and Japan by
0.4-0.5 percentage points in the first year.
This reflects lower external demand, with the
volume of world trade declining by over Wi per
cent, as well as the appreciation of the euro and
the yen against the dollar. This occurs because
of a prompt monetary response in the United
States, with short-term interest rates being re-
duced by around 1 percentage point. If the
Federal Reserve did not act in this manner, then
it is likely that there would be a larger down-
turn than shown here. The models differ in their
estimate of the subsequent persistence of the
shock on output, reflecting differences in the
speed at which deflationary effects emerge on
prices, as well as in the size of the adjustment
in short-term interest rates.
The responses to a global equity price shock
are summarised in Table 6. They are similar to
those found from a price drop in the United
States alone, although as might be expected
they are larger and persist for longer. The di-
rect, additional short-term effects on output in
Europe and Japan are limited, reflecting the
smaller direct effects from equity prices on
final demand in these economies. Interest rates
in the euro area are projected to fall by 30 basis
points in the first year and over 50 basis points
in the second year. The Japanese authorities
would be likely to face an additional policy di-
lemma, as short-term interest rates are already
assumed to be close to zero on the base, and
hence, there is limited scope to reduce them
further. This is likely to prolong the deflation-
ary effects of such a shock in Japan.
In summary, there are grounds for suggesting
that equity prices may currently be overvalued
in a number of economies. A substantive cor-
rection would imply a negative effect on out-
put, particularly in the United States, but also in
other economies. This would have a consider-
able impact on the European economies, raising
the possibility that the projected upturn may be
postponed, or at least weaker than forecast.20
VII. Country Reports
1. Germany
The switch to the new European system of
national accounts (ESA95) has led to a major
revision in German GDP figures. Although the
level of GDP has been increased as a result of
these changes, growth in recent years has been
revised downwards significantly. However, de-
spite a reduction in the 1998 growth rate to
only 2.3 per cent, as compared to 2.8 per cent
on the old statistical basis, the quarterly profile
of developments through the year remained
basically intact. The main change has occurred
with respect to stockbuilding which had been
implausibly high according to the old statistics
and has been revised downwards substantially.
After the revision of the statistical base, the
underlying momentum of growth in the German
economy appears to be weaker than before;
however, the assessment of the cyclical situ-
ation and prospects has not changed significant-
s-
Economic activity in Germany started to
slow in the summer of 1998 as the effects of the
crises in the emerging markets worked their
way through the world economy. This weak-
ness has extended into the first half of 1999.
Real GDP is estimated to have risen only
slightly in the first quarter of this year, after
falling by 0.6 per cent in the last quarter of
1998. The cyclical slowdown was triggered by
dwindling exports and has resulted in a marked
deterioration of corporate sentiment. Uncertain-
ty and growing scepticism about the plans of
the new government have also contributed to a
cautious attitude of investors. In contrast, pri-
vate consumption has continued to grow brisk-
ly, helped by increasing real disposable in-
comes and exceptionally low consumer price
inflation. The improvement in the labour mar-
ket has come to a standstill. Employment
growth stalled during the winter, and rising
short time work and an increase in inflows into
unemployment indicate that the labour market
has started to deteriorate. However, the overall
unemployment rate has continued to decline, if
only very slightly, mainly reflecting a reduction
in labour supply.
In the economy as a whole, wages have risen
by over 3 per cent in the wage round this year,
following moderate wage settlements of around
IV2 per cent in the preceding years. Given that
price inflation is expected to remain low, real
wages are likely to grow more quickly than pro-
ductivity. This makes labour shedding even
more probable than it already is as a result of
the current slowdown in activity. We expect
employment to fall during this year, but pick up
slightly next year as production recovers and
wage settlements moderate.
Leading indicators suggest that the German
economy will gain momentum with demand,
supported by low interest rates and an improve-
ment in the external environment. The expan-
sion will be driven by a recovery of exports and
continued growth of around 2 per cent in pri-
vate consumption, helped by rising disposable
income. According to a provisional assessment
in corporating the new statistical base, real
GDP is expected to rise by about 1.2 per cent
and 2.3 per cent in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
The unemployment rate will continue to de-
crease gradually to under 11 per cent this year
and below IOV2 per cent next year. The decline
of unemployment is larger than the expected in-
crease of employment due to an unusually large
projected drop in the supply of labour, amount-
ing to some 500,000 people over the years 1999
and 2000. Consumer price inflation will remain
moderate, but pick up from the low point seen
in the first quarter of this year, reflecting rising
import prices and increasing unit labour costs.
Next year, the annual inflation rate will rise to
1.5 percent.
Fiscal policies in 1999 and 2000 will, if any-
thing, be slightly expansionary, mainly as a re-
sult of an easing of the expenditure restraint,
particularly in the social insurance schemes.
This year, a number of tax changes largely
cancel out in terms of their effect on general
government revenue. Energy taxes have been
increased, but the rate of contribution to the
public pension system has been reduced in the
first step of the so-called "ecological tax re-
form". Fiscal policy measures for the coming21
year are still under debate. There is an obli-
gation to increase family allowances substan-
tially due to a decision from the Federal Con-
stitutional Court, but the precise way to achieve
this and the effective tax relief resulting from
it are not yet clear. The new minister of finance
has made public commitments to proceed with
the consolidation of government finances,
which makes it likely that a small solution will
be sought in order to minimise the effect on the
public finances. It is likely that only minor
changes will occur in the much debated reform
of corporate taxation, consisting of a substan-
tial cut in tax rates combined with a broadening
of the tax base. A significant tax reform is ex-
pected to become effective only from 2001, but
even this will be on a rather small scale given
the apparent inability of the government to mo-
bilise resources by reducing expenditure, par-
ticularly on subsidies. On balance, fiscal policy
is expected to strengthen demand slightly in the
coming year, but significant reforms to improve
incentives in order to increase the underlying
trend rate of growth are not expected.
2. France
In 1998, French GDP increased by 3.2 per cent,
around half a percentage point above that for
the euro area as a whole under the new ESA95
accounts. This gap, already perceptible during
last year, has recently widened. Domestic de-
mand, excluding inventories, has remained ro-
bust, and France has suffered less than Ger-
many and Italy from the Asian and Russian
crises. Even so, manufacturing output fell by
over 1 per cent in the final months of last year.
But recent surveys have pointed to a stabil-
isation of output which will help to support
GDP in the first half of this year. The downturn
in manufacturing has hardly affected the rest of
the economy, apart from gross trade related to
intermediate goods. Activity in the construction
industry has remained strong, and retail sales
volumes have continued to increase steadily.
Service sector growth has slowed but activity
has continued to rise.
Employment has risen by over 350,000
during last year, helping to boost household
confidence to record levels. However, a small
drop in hiring intentions has recently reduced
optimism about unemployment prospects. In-
deed, market activities are expected to add only
210,000 jobs in 1999, after 290,000 in 1998.
However, an additional 60,000 jobs are ex-
pected to stem from the 35 hours scheme and
other non-market job creation schemes. We ex-
pect to see around 320,000 new jobs created
this year and in the year 2000. Unemployment
is expected to decline from HVi per cent to 10
per cent next year.
The reduction in the weekly working time is
expected to cause the growth of nominal hourly
wages to accelerate from 2 per cent to nearly
3 per cent this year and 4 per cent during 2000.
However, the growth of real labour compen-
sation will be restrained by fewer working
hours and somewhat higher price inflation.
Consumer prices are expected to increase by
VA per cent in 1999 and 2000, 1 percentage
point more than in 1998. The growth of real
disposable incomes will moderate to around 2Vi
per cent from a peak of almost 5 per cent in the
middle of 1998. The growth of private con-
sumption is expected to slow from 4Vz per cent
to around 3 per cent. Car sales have already re-
covered from their previous slump, while de-
mand for other durables is still boosted by low
interest rates and a booming real estate sector.
With investment demand expected to remain
strong, the slowdown of output growth in 1999
and 2000 will be limited. Growth is expected to
dip to around 2V2 per cent this year, before
picking up to over 3 per cent next year.
The present strength of the French economy
in the current global environment can be at-
tributed partly to a catching-up process after
many years of high real interest rates. Housing
investment has only recently begun to recover
from the 1990 crisis, as households and realtors
have reduced their debt levels. The same ap-
plies to the manufacturing sector, where bal-
ance sheets have greatly improved, and ca-
pacity utilisation remains above normal levels
in spite of weak demand. The recent fall of the
euro may also help to raise the growth of in-22
vestment. Stable unit costs and improved cash
flows have helped many firms to cope with
greater competitive pressures.
Strong consumption is likely to raise the
growth of tax revenues. The public finances are
not expected to be significantly affected by the
slowdown in activity. However, general gov-
ernment expenditure will probably be greater
than planned, due to higher health expenditure.
The public deficit on the Maastricht definition
is likely to be around 2.4 per cent of GDP in
1999 and 2 per cent in 2000. After the recent
cut in nominal interest rates by the ECB, mon-
etary policy can be considered as broadly
neutral for France, having previously been
somewhat restrictive.
3. Italy
According to new data on the ESA95 basis,
GDP increased by 1.3 per cent in 1998, less
than half the growth rate for the overall euro
area. This was mainly due to weak export de-
mand as a result of the Asian crisis. The extent
of the difficulties faced by the Italian external
sector last year came as a surprise and caused
growth rate forecasts to be revised downward
several times. There is a lively debate on the
causes of the problems faced by the export sec-
tor and doubts about the competitiveness of the
economy.
The decline in the quarterly growth of output
through last year, with GDP decreasing by 0.3
per cent in the fourth quarter, will act to subdue
calendar year growth in 1999. Growth is likely
to be further affected by the unfavourable inter-
national economic environment in the early part
of this year and by the effect of the Kosovo
crisis on the confidence of households and
businesses. Industrial production declined by
VA per cent in the first three months of the
year, and the available cyclical indicators re-
main weak. There is some sign of recovery in
the April data on production expectations of
companies, but household confidence continues
to decline.
Economic activity is expected to pick up in
the second half of the year, supported by some
specific factors. The economy should begin to
benefit from the significant reduction in interest
rates over the past year, new fiscal incentives
for housing investment and from a more favour-
able tax treatment of reinvested profits, helping
to stimulate business investment. Nevertheless,
a risk remains that the Kosovo crisis could have
a significant impact on the economy, both by
hitting the important tourist industry, and by
adversely affecting expectations. Taking the
very poor performance in the first part of the
year into account, it is unlikely that GDP
growth will be higher than \
lA per cent. Even
though the contribution of net exports to GDP
growth is almost neutral after reducing growth
by 1.1 percentage points last year, the rate of
growth of internal demand is expected to slow
to 1.4 per cent from 2.3 per cent in 1998.
Inflation is low; in the first quarter, produc-
tion prices declined by 1.7 per cent year over
year, with the prices of intermediate goods
dropping by 3.7 per cent. Consumer price in-
flation averaged just 1.4 per cent in the period
from January to April. In the next few months,
inflation is likely to remain almost flat, despite
the expected increase in oil and raw material
prices as well as the appreciation of the dollar.
Wages are growing at around 3 per cent and
unit labour costs by 1.4 per cent, m spite of the
weak growth of GDP, employment has been
rising since last year. In 1998, the number of
employees increased by between 0.5 per cent
and 0.7 per cent (depending on the source of
the data), and this development continued in
January, with employment 1 per cent higher
than a year earlier. Because most of the new
jobs are part-time or with a predetermined time
horizon, the recent measures introduced in
order to make the Italian labour market more
flexible seem to be successful. Nevertheless,
the unemployment rate is still rising (from 12.3
per cent on average last year to 12.4 per cent in
January) because of increased labour supply.
Next year, the growth differential between
Italy and the euro area is predicted to decline.
In 2000, Italian GDP growth is expected to
be 2.3 per cent, mainly due to the recovery in
domestic demand. Once the more favourable
tax treatment of reinvested profits comes into23
force, investment in machinery and equipment
will be the most dynamic component of domes-
tic demand rising by around 6Vi per cent. The
growth of household consumption will also
gather momentum to around 2.6 per cent. At the
same time, the contribution to the growth of
GDP from net exports is expected to become
less negative than in the recent past, even
though the increase in aggregate demand will
expand imports. Inflation is expected to remain
low next year by historical standards, at 1.3 per
cent using the H3CP, and more in line with the
rates forecast for the other euro area countries.
In spite of the fact that the public accounts so
far this year are better than a year ago, the gen-
eral government deficit in 1999 will be higher
than the government had expected one year
ago, due to the moderate pace of economic
growth and the effects of the Kosovo crisis. In
fact, we expect that the Italian government will
let automatic stabilisers work and use a further
reduction in interest payments to finance the in-
creasing expenditures for the Kosovo crisis and
humanitarian aid. Under these circumstances,
the deficit for this year will be 2.7 per cent of
GDP, as in 1998. In 2000, the general govern-
ment deficit will decline towards a level of
2.2 percent, but it is unlikely to reach the target
of 1.5 per cent announced by the government
last year. It should be noted that new targets
will be announced in June. An upward revision
is probable, due to weaker economic growth.
However, it is likely that the plans will show a
further structural reduction of the deficit as the
recovery expected from the year 2000 onward
gets underway.
4. United Kingdom
Growth has slowed sharply in the United King-
dom over the past eighteen months. Preliminary
estimates suggest that GDP was flat in the first
quarter of 1999, after rising by 0.1 per cent in
the last quarter of 1998, and was just 0.6 per
cent higher than a year earlier. However, it
appears increasingly unlikely that the United
Kingdom will experience any significant fur-
ther downturn. The latest monthly GDP esti-
mates from the NIESR project growth of
0.2 per cent in the three months to April.
Business and consumer confidence have begun
to pick up, helped by the significant easing of
2V* percentage points in short-term interest
rates since the autumn of last year. Government
expenditure is also set to rise in the current
fiscal year at the fastest rate since 1991. Output
at market prices is expected to be almost 2 per
cent higher by the end of the year than it was at
the end of 1998, consistent with a calendar year
growth rate of about VA per cent.
In 2000, growth is expected to return to
trend, with GDP rising by 2.3 per cent through
the course of the year. Indeed, there are some
risks of renewed inflationary pressure. House-
hold consumption is forecast to grow by over
2V2 per cent, supported by further strong in-
come growth and a good background of low
nominal interest rates, increasing wealth and
receding worries about the possibility of a sig-
nificant upturn in unemployment. Share prices
have reached record highs in the early part of
this year. While there are strong grounds for
believing them to be overvalued, the forecast
makes the assumption that they continue to rise
at the same rate as nominal income. Fixed in-
vestment is also likely to benefit from a low
cost of capital and improving confidence as
final demand strengthens. Unless the exchange
rate rises further, the outlook for the traded
goods sector should also improve next year.
The visible trade deficit has risen sharply
over the past year, partly as a result of the un-
competitive level of the British pound. The
deficit is expected to rise to £27V2 billion this
year, from £20
1/2 billion in 1998, and rise
further to £3\V2 billion next year. This has been
partly offset by strong growth in net investment
income and receipts from services. We expect
the current account to remain in balance in
1999, but to show a deficit of £10 billion in
2000.
There continues to be a marked divergence
between the industrial and service sectors at the
present time, with industrial production de-
clining by 0.9 per cent in the first quarter of
1999, whilst output of the service industries
rose by 0.4 per cent. Service sector activity24
continues to be supported by domestic demand.
This is expected to rise by between 2-2V4 per
cent this year.
The manufacturing sector has been hit by the
downturn in external demand and the continued
significant overvaluation of the real effective
exchange rate. At present levels, the real ex-
change rate, measured on the basis of unit la-
bour costs in the United Kingdom relative to
the euro area, is some 20 per cent higher than
the average level over the past 25 years. The
decline in net exports of goods and services
reduced GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points
last year, with a further drop of 1 percentage
point expected this year. Manufacturing output
and investment both fell sharply in the latter
half of last year. We expect manufacturing out-
put to fall by 1% per cent this year and rise by
just 0.5 per cent through the course of next
year.
There is little sign in the United Kingdom of
a pick-up in productivity similar to that seen
in the United States and Australia. During the
past four years, employment growth has been
strong, but total labour productivity has risen
by only 0.8 per cent per annum on average.
Productivity growth is likely to slow to around
0.4 per cent this year, with firms retaining
workers in the expectation that the downturn in
demand will be temporary. The claimant unem-
ployment rate is expected to remain at around
4Vi per cent, in part because positive schemes
have been implemented that would be reducing
sustainable unemployment if the economy were
growing at trend. The 'New Deal' activates the
long-term unemployed and youths, and pro-
vides them with training, a subsidised job or
public sector work.
Labour market developments over the next
year are likely to reflect the recent introduction
of the National Minimum Wage. This has been
set at a level which directly affects the pay of
around 1.9 million employees (7 per cent of
total employment). This is likely to add around
1 per cent to the level of wages, and will ulti-
mately have a modest negative impact on em-
ployment. Overall, average earnings are expect-
ed to rise by 4
XA to 4Vz per cent this year and a
little over 5 per cent in 2000. With productivity
growth remaining weak, unit labour costs are
forecast to rise by over 4 per cent this year,
after growth of 4
3A per cent in 1998.
Domestic cost pressures have yet to show up
in inflation, largely due to the strength of the
pound. Import prices fell by over 6 per cent in
both 1997 and 1998. With the pound not ex-
pected to appreciate further over the coming
year, domestic price inflation is projected to
gradually move back in line with domestic
costs. The annual rate of increase in the official
target measure of the Bank of England, the re-
tail price index excluding mortgage interest
payments, is expected to decline from 2.4 per
cent this April to 1.8 per cent in the fourth
quarter of this year, before rising to 2.7 per cent
over the course of next year.
It is thus now possible that further interest
rate reductions would endanger the inflation
target, particularly, if the pound begins to de-
preciate rapidly over the course of next year, or
if there are signs of a sustained pick-up in the
growth rate of wages. The forecast in this re-
port thus assumes that short-term interest rates
remain at 5V* % until the end of next year, with
the pound depreciating against the euro by
4 per cent. However, if the pound were to re-
main at its present level, inflationary pressures
would be weaker, and there would be scope for
further reductions. Similar judgements are ap-
parent in recent statements from officials at the
Bank of England.
The outlook for the public finances has been
transformed in recent years, with significant
fiscal consolidation. The public sector net cash
requirement declined from £31 billion in
1995/6 to £1.1 billion in 1997/8, with an esti-
mated surplus of £7.4 million being achieved in
1998/9. The improvement was achieved by con-
tinued firm expenditure control and some in-
crease in the tax share. There may be a small
deficit this year, but this largely reflects
changes in the timing of tax payments. The
March Budget did little to change the thrust
of fiscal policy in the short to medium term.
Overall, the many measures in the Budget
implied a small fiscal relaxation of up to
£y/i billion in 2001/2 compared to previous
plans, and so the rise in the net tax burden this25
year and next will be smaller than previously
expected. In cyclically adjusted terms, public
sector net borrowing remains set to be approxi-
mately zero over the next five fiscal years. The
government appears well on course to meet its
own fiscal objectives of avoiding a deficit on
the current balance and keeping its net in-
debtedness below 40 per cent of GDP.
5. Spain
The Spanish economy expanded at 3.8 per cent
in the course of 1998, sustained by domestic
demand (4.9 per cent). Easy monetary policy
conditions and strong job creation supported
consumers and industry confidence. Low in-
flation and strong equity and asset price growth
have led to significant increases in real finan-
cial wealth, and this helped raise consumption.
Strong demand and low cost of capital deter-
mined the strong growth of investments. On the
other hand, net exports negatively contributed
to GDP growth by 1.1 per cent. This reflected
the effects of the slowdown in the rest of the
euro area in the second part of 1998 as well as
the greater exposure of the Spanish economy to
the effects of slower activity in Latin America.
Growth in merchandise exports slowed from
15.8 per cent in 1997 to 6.6 per cent in 1998,
reflecting both a slowdown in market growth
and a loss of competitiveness. Despite moder-
ate wage settlements, inflation remained above
the euro area average, with inflationary pres-
sures in services being particularly stubborn.
Employment rose by 3.8 per cent in the
fourth quarter of 1998, continuing several years
of labour-intensive growth. This led to a
marked fall in unemployment. The unemploy-
ment rate declined to 18.8 per cent on average
in 1998 (20.8 per cent in 1997). These changes
in employment and unemployment in 1998 con-
firmed the success of reforms over the last few
years, aiming at suppressing the rigidities of the
Spanish labour market. The reforms have been
a major factor increasing employment, and they
have also helped reduce real wage growth for
all members of the workforce by reducing the
bargaining power of permanent employees vis-
a-vis employers and the unemployed. They
allowed the very significant pool of unem-
ployed workers to put downward pressure on
real wages, and hence increased the effective
supply of labour.
The government deficit fell to 1.8 per cent of
GDP in 1998, outperforming the initial target,
thanks to stronger than expected revenues. This
mainly reflected robust economic activity and
was helped by the cumulating effects of low
interest rates on the stock of debt. Fiscal policy
for 1999 and 2000 includes a significant per-
sonal income tax reform which, among other
things, lowers marginal rates. In addition, the
lowering of employers' social security contri-
butions for targeted groups of employees will
be extended for two more years. This will con-
tribute to reduce receipts, but because of expec-
ted buoyant domestic demand, revenue growth
should remain strong. The tax reform will boost
disposable income, the total effect on demand
remaining neutral, as the fiscal stimulus due to
the tax reform will be offset by planned slow
growth in primary spending.
According to the results of the collective
bargaining process, wages will rise by 2.3 per
cent on average in 1999, decelerating from the
previous year (2.6 per cent). This will con-
tribute to constrain the underlying inflation.
Confidence indicators show some worsening
in the expectation of both consumers and in-
dustry. However, domestic demand is expected
to remain strong. Household consumption will
take advantage of the changes in the tax system
and the favourable conditions on the labour
market. Overall, investment growth may slow
down only slightly with respect to 1998. Ac-
tivity is still very strong, the rate of capacity
utilisation is close to an historical peak, and
profits are solid. The low cost of capital will
also stimulate total investment. The negative
contribution of the external sector is going to
worsen in the course of 1999. Export growth
will slow further, as the effects of the Brazilian
devaluation and lower imports in Latin
America will completely materialise. The share
of merchandise exports from Spain to this
region is approximately 6.4 per cent. Robust
domestic demand growth and some loss of26
competitiveness, due to relatively high inflation
as compared to the rest of Europe, is likely to
keep import growth strong in 1999, although it
will fall significantly from the 13.2 per cent
seen in 1998. There are few signs of inflation-
ary pressures emerging in the economy. The
slight increase in the first quarter of the annual
inflation rate to 1.9 per cent mostly reflects
some specific domestic factors. On average,
inflation is expected to be around 2 percent in
1999, as a result of opposite forces: the output
gap is closing rapidly, but on the other side,
weak exports will help decreasing upward pres-
sures on demand. Employment is expected to
grow further as reforms reducing labour market
segmentation and the costs of job creation con-
tinue.
6. The Netherlands
In the middle of last year, the upward phase of
the business cycle came to an end in the
Netherlands. The decline in world trade led to a
sharp reaction in exports and, consequently,
GDP growth. Whereas the export volume in the
first half of 1998 was still over 10 per cent up
on the previous six-month period, in the second
half of the year, export growth was virtually
zero. Exports are expected to pick up in the
second half of 1999, which leads to a year on
year growth rate of about 2 per cent, compared
to 7.5 per cent last year. The modest export
performance is offset by still highly buoyant
household consumption this year. At 3% per
cent consumption is growing less than last year
(4.5 per cent), but this figure is still well above
the long-term average. This high year-over-year
increase is mainly due to the acceleration of
consumer spending in the second half of 1998.
Mainly thanks to the strength of consumption,
the economic downturn remains in bounds,
with GDP growth moderating from a very
healthy 3.8 per cent last year to about 2 per cent
in 1999.
In the central projection, GDP growth re-
mains stable at 2 per cent in 2000. Exports will
clearly pick up, but consumption growth will
ease next year. The consumer willingness to
buy is expected to become less dynamic in
the near future, because job creation is losing
momentum, purchasing power is increasing
less, and the wealth effects of higher stock
prices on consumption are ebbing away. All in
all, the cyclical slowdown of the Dutch econ-
omy in 1999 and 2000 is, with twice 2 per cent
GDP growth, milder than the previous down-
swing in the early 1990s.
In the March projection, we have forecasted
inflation to fall from around 2 per cent in 1996-
1998 to around 1 per cent in 1999-2000, on the
back of the (delayed) knock-on effect of the
lower import prices. However, the 1999 in-
flation rate is likely to exceed this forecast,
since realisations for the January-April con-
sumer price index are hovering in the 2-2V4 per
cent range, import prices have bottomed out in
the first quarter of 1999, and the dollar ex-
change rate is higher than projected two months
ago. The March projection also provides for a
fall in contractual pay increases to Wz per cent
next year (from 2
3A per cent this year). This
forecast is based on the fall in inflation en-
visaged for 1999-2000, that is mentioned
above, on the expectation that the prolonged
strong downward trend in unemployment will
come to an end, and the assumption of restraint
by the social partners in pay formation. Recent-
ly concluded collective labour agreements point
to substantial higher contractual wage increases
than included in the March projection. There-
fore, an upward revision of the contractual pay
increases in 2000 is likely, and, as a conse-
quence, inflation will also be somewhat higher
next year.
Since the presentation of the Budget (Sep-
tember 1998), the short-term prospects for the
Dutch economy have worsened considerably.
Nevertheless, its negative impact on the general
government balance will only to a limited
extent be visible in 1999. Tax receipts on cor-
porate profits will be lower than expected half a
year ago, but indirect taxes and income tax- and
premium receipts will by and large be the same.
However, on the expenditure side, two addi-
tional expenses have emerged, i.e. compen-
sation payments in connection with the heavy
rainfall of last autumn and higher than en-27
visaged outlays for asylum seekers. As a con-
sequence, the EMU deficit rises this year to 1%
per cent of GDP, whereas a deficit of VA per
cent of GDP was expected in September 1998.
The lower economic growth will make itself
felt in the year 2000 public finances. The
number of persons without a job is expected to
rise for the first time since 1994. At the same
time, the tax receipts will be affected by the
slowdown in household spending and lower
corporate profits. Under these circumstances,
the deficit of the central government is ex-
pected to rise, in the absence of additional
budgetary measures. However, the EMU deficit
will decrease marginally, due to the increasing
surpluses of the social funds.